Verbs or adjectives and their nominalizations and certain adverb adjective pairs can be argued to introduce the same concept. This can be shown through inference patterns, which can be explained if we assume Davidsonian eventualities underlying all predicates. We make a contribution to the underlying state discussion by investigating the advantages and disadvantages of Davidsonian versus Kimian states for statives such as copular predicates. Findings are implemented in our parser Delilah.
Introduction
Several computational semantics systems have by now implemented a form of event analysis for verbs [1, 3] . There has been much debate on whether it is desirable to assume underlying states, parallel to underlying events. Katz [9] argues against an underlying state analysis, even for stative verbs, whereas Parsons [12] is ready to accept an underlying state analysis, even for simple nouns. It is clear that states are more problematic than events.
We discuss some cases where words of different categories can be argued to introduce the same concept: verbs and their nominalizations and adjectives and their corresponding abstract nouns. We show that underlying states give us the same advantages as underlying events, with respect to recognizing concepts across categories for the purpose of inference, as they reify the predicates. We then discuss an alternative representation for copular expressions, based on the conviction that the states in these expressions are ontologically different from eventualities, and show that it has unfavorable consequences for inference. We end with a short note on related adjective-adverb pairs.
The present research was carried out in the context of the Narrator project, which aims at the development of a system for storage and retrieval of personal illness relating narratives [13, 14] . In this project we use and further develop a semantic parser/generator for Dutch, Delilah [5, 4] . Delilah is driven by a Combinatory Categorial Grammar and has a semantic output in first order logic with neo-Davidsonian event structures.
In this section we use nominalizations of verbs to illustrate our main considerations. Sentence (1a) uses the noun operatie 'operation, surgery' and (1b) uses the verb opereren 'operate'. The intuition is that (1a) and (1b) are equivalent. They can be inferred from each other.
( Since the narratives in Narrator are about experiences of patients (in the prototype being currently developed, on breast cancer), this kind of information is rather relevant and should preferably not be missed or misinterpreted. If one of the search criteria is, for example, that the narrative should tell about a patient who had surgery, then each of these sentences above, if occurring in a narrative, provides the relevant information to determine wether it meets this search criterion or not. And of each pair, both variants provide the same information.
Opereren en operatie introduce the same concept. Also the relation between opereren/operatie and Marie is the same in both (1a) and (1b). Arguably it can also be inferred in both cases that there is yet someone else involved who is not mentioned, a filler for the agent-slot of opereren/operatie.
A form of neo-Davidsonian event analysis can be used to give both sentences the same semantic representation. The basic event representation for both (1a) and (1b) is illustrated below. The representation is based on Parsons [11] . (The "concept of" relation is comparable to Jurafsky and Martin's "is-a" [8] .). The verb form is taken to name the concept. The verb can be considered as basic in a situation like this, because underived nouns do not usually introduce events. As it does not lie within the scope of this paper to discuss what is the best way to represent time/tense, we keep the representations very simple in that respect.
For (1b) this kind of representation is quite standard, and event representations for event-denoting nominalizations have also been suggested before [11, 7] . The verb ondergaan in (1a) plays a special role. It places the event in time (makes it extensional) and it lets its subject be the theme of the surgery event.
Adjectives and nouns
In the previous section we have looked at nominalizations of verbs, and seen that event semantics helps us getting the right entailments. Now we will look at adjectives and their nominalizations. The pair below is at least close to equivalent. Who has an illness, is ill. Who is ill, has at least one illness. One could try to treat 'have an illness' as a kind of collocation and this way have (4a) interpreted as ill(Mary). This, however leaves no space in the representation for the determiner, which may vary in form and accordingly in interpretation.
For the pair boos/boosheid, it is more difficult to come up with two equivalent sentences, for lack of a suitable "support verb". Still we can observe that (5a) entails (5b). For Katz, however, stative nominalizations denote either a fact or an extent/degree, but never a state. So (5a) could mean that Jan tried to hide (the fact) that he was angry, or how angry he was, but not the state of his being angry. At least the factive reading seems very intuitive here. It is not clear whether there is also a stative reading. In some other contexts, though, a factive reading is not possible. In (6a) boosheid is combined with a durational predicate. (A fact does not have a duration; once a fact, always a fact.) An extent or degree reading doesn't seem to make a lot of sense either. Besides, even if zijn boosheid in (5a) does only have a factive reading, how should we represent the content of this fact in such a way that (5b) follows from it and that we faithfully represent the quantifier? (His anger is deninite.) We can't choose a representation like angry(Jan), because of the quantifier. But if we represent it as a noun (with a possessive kind of relation to Jan), while still using a traditional representation for (5b), then we lose the entailment. So even when embedded in a fact, reification of the predicate still yields better representations.
These considerations lead us to the following type of representation for sentences like (4b) and (5b). Interestingly, for the adjective-noun pairs it is not always that clear and systematic which is the basic form. For the verb -noun pairs above the verb was always basic and the noun was its nominalization. There are also verbs derived from nouns, but they follow a different pattern. Adjective -noun pairs behave less systematically. In the pair verdrietig 'sad' -verdriet 'sadness', the adjective seems to be the derived form in Dutch, whereas in English the noun has a nominalizing suffix. And for boos 'angry' -boosheid 'anger' it is the other way around.
An alternative representation
We have seen that adjectives and their "nominalizations" display the same kind of inference patterns as verbs and their nominalizations, and that reification of the predicate, through postulating an eventuality argument, makes these patterns follow naturally. This reification seems to be the crucial point, though. And since independent evidence for a Davidsonian analysis for statives is kind of shaky, we should investigate whether we really need the full structure. Maienborn [10] proposes a representation for statives which does involve reification of the predicate, but is different from the Davidsonian event structure representation. In this section we discuss this alternative.
Kimian states
Maienborn argues for a distinction between Davidsonian states (D-states) and Kimian states (K-states). Examples of verbs introducing D-states are stand, sit and sleep. Examples of verbs introducing K-states are know, hate, resemble and copular expressions. In the latter it is the copula that introduces the Kstate.
D-states introduce a normal Davidsonian argument, just like other eventualities. For the K-states Maienborn shows that, like D-states, they are available to anaphoric reference and time modification, and therefore they need a referential argument. This referential argument, she argues though, is of a different ontological kind than Davidsonian eventuality arguments. It is of a more abstract nature, similar to facts and propositions. The main argument is their deviant combinatorial behavior. K-state verbs can not serve as the infinitival complement of a verb of perception (see also examples (12b) and (14a) later in this section), they cannot combine with most adverbials, such as manner adverbs and instrumentals, and neither do they combine with locative modifiers, all of this in contrast with D-states and other eventualities. This brings her to the following (tentative) definition of K-states.
(8) Kimian states:
K-states are abstract objects for the exemplification of a property P at a holder x at a time t.
Here are some of Maienborn's (German) examples: (9a), with a D-state, is represented as (9b), and (10a), with a K-state, is represented as (10b). The representations are in a flat DRT notation. 
The embedded box in (10b) contains the property that is the K-state, and the discourse referent s reifies this property.
Some modifications
Engelberg [6] proposes a few modifications to this view on K-states. He argues the K-state should not be introduced by the copula, but rather by the postcopula predicate (e.g. an adjective), because attributively used adjectives also show the relevant behavior, without being accompanied by a copula.
Also, he shows that it is problematic to put individuals introduced by an NP under the copula in the box that is introduced by "≈" and presents the 'content' of the state. Because in that case the state in (11a) (being related to Opus) would be a different one then the state in (11b) (being related to George). And while the states in (11b) and (11d) are the same, if Opus is the tuba player of the Deathtöngue, since the subject is in the outer box and therefore extensionalized over, this is not the case for the states in (11a) and (11c).
(11) a. George is related to Opus.
b. Opus is related to George. c. George is related to the tuba player of the Deathtöngue d. The tuba player of the Deathtöngue is related to George.
Identity relations between states get more coherent and intuitive if the content of the box embedded under "≈" is restricted to only the core predicate (e.g. related(x, y)). Now if Engelberg is right that K-states are not more fine grained than events and D-states, and the content of the embedded K-state box is in all cases only a core predicate, one can wonder what the advantage of the Kimian style representation still is. For facts and propositions this kind of representation is useful, exactly because the content of a proposition is more than a single predicate; it is a full-fledged proposition, and it makes sense to assign a referential argument to the proposition as a whole. Individuals introduced by NPs in embedded propositions are not extensionalized over. If George said that he is related to Opus and if Opus is the tuba player of the Deathtöngue, it is not entailed that George said that he is related to the tuba player of the Deathtöngue. The main remaining difference between the D-state and K-state representations seems to be that the K-state predicate directly predicates over its argument(s), whereas in D-states this relation is mediated through theta roles. It is not clear why this should be the case.
Entailments between K-state and D-state verbs
Representing K-states in a different format than D-states, also causes another complication in the domain of inference. German liegen 'to lie' is a D-state verb, hence the grammaticality of (12a). Sein 'to be' and also sich befinden 'to be located' are K-state verbs, as shown by the ungrammaticality of (12b). Here it is not plausible that (15a) contains a D-state as well as a K-state, because the presence of this D-state should save (14a).
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Although the distinction between two groups of statives with different behavior is very convincing, we conclude that in a semantic representation for inference purposes, it does not seem to be a good idea to treat to sleep and to be asleep as fundamentally different kinds of entities. We therefore stick to Davidsonian style representations for all states. The differences between the two classes that Maienborn shows are of course real. But as they mainly seem relevant for selectional restrictions, they can probably best be captured as part of the feature structure of the predicates, in a computational system like ours. In Delilah the decision of whether two constituents can combine to form a new one depends on the unifiability of their graphs of features. Here one can include a feature that says for example that a predicate is "abstract". Verbs of perception, all kinds of adverbials and locative modifiers can then be specified for combining only with concrete predicates. The semantic representation then only needs to contain information that is relevant for inference.
Adjectives and adverbs
Adjectives and adverbs are closely related categories [2] . (The main group of adverbs that also occur as adjectives are the manner adverbs.) If we assume
